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ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):
An Exercise in Coercing Virtue?
Jack Park
In August 2016, at its annual convention, which was held in San
Francisco, California the American Bar Association (ABA) approved
a revision to Rule 8.4(g) of its Model Rules of Professional Conduct.1
That new rule is not self-executing. Instead, it will have to be
submitted to the licensing authorities in the states.
To date, only Vermont has adopted the new rule.2 A number
of states, including Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas have rejected proposals to
adopt the rule in their respective states.3 Several other states are
considering its adoption. So, it’s not off to a roaring start.
There are good reasons for the remaining states to look
skeptically at the proposed rule. In this Article, I first introduce the
ABA and point out why it embarked on this enterprise. Then, I
explain the wide-ranging scope of the proposed new rule. The new
rule represents a significant expansion in the scope of potential
disciplinary authority and exposure. I then point to the First
Amendment problems it raises. Finally, I explain how it presents
problems for the disciplinary authorities.
I. THE ABA AND ITS ROLE
A. The ABA as Professional Regulator
At the outset we should keep in mind that the proposed rule
is the product of the ABA, which represents only a small subset
of the profession. In August 2018, Roy Strom reported that the
 Mr. Jack Park is a solo practitioner based in Gainesville, GA. He is a participating
attorney for the Southeastern Legal Foundation and a Visiting Legal Fellow for the
Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions. Jack has written amicus briefs for a number
of litigating foundations and continues that work along with other civil litigation.
1 See generally Samson Habte, ABA Delegates Overwhelmingly Approve Anti-Bias
Rule, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.bna.com/aba-delegates-overwhelminglyn73014446149/ [http://perma.cc/W46N-XREW].
2 See States split on new ABA Model Rule limiting harassing or discriminatory conduct,
ABA J., http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ethics_model_rule_harassing_conduct/news/
article/does_a_diverse_bench_really_matter/?icn=sidebar&ici=text [http://perma.cc/38AP-RM3D]
[hereinafter States Split on new ABA Model Rule].
3 See id.
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ABA had fewer than 200,000 dues-paying members and an estimated
400,000 total members.4 That’s out of an estimated 1.3 million
lawyers in the United States.5 To boost membership, the ABA has
adopted “a simpler and less-expensive schedule of membership fees
in an effort to revitalize the association’s long-declining membership
rates.”6 If the plan works, it will have 268,812 paying members in
2024, instead of the expected 155,766.7 Either way, though, its
membership will still be far less than a majority of the total number
of lawyers in the United States.
That said, the ABA represents an outsized player in the legal
world. As the late Professor Ron Rotunda observed, the ABA “is
more than a trade association. It also has some governmental
power, which makes its latest foray into political correctness of
more than passing interest.”8 It periodically, as here, considers
and proposes changes in the ethical constraints on lawyers. In
addition, the ABA’s influence over federal judicial nominations
waxes and wanes with changes in administrations.9
Moreover, the ABA has been given the power to accredit law
schools. Those law schools must teach the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility, and their students must pass a
Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, which incorporates
those Rules, to be licensed.10 As a result, it is entirely possible
that Rule 8.4(g) will appear on the test even if it has not been
adopted by a particular state.
The proposed rule is an exercise in professional regulation.
Professor Rotunda explained that, whenever lawyers draft rules
to govern the practice of law, “[w]hatever advantage we lawyers
have with intimate knowledge of the subject matter—the practice
of law—we must counterbalance with the self-interest inherent
when lawyers draft rules governing their own behavior.”11
4 Roy Strom, ABA to Slash Dues Amid Membership Drop, AM. LAW. (Aug. 6, 2018,
4:03 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/08/06/aba-to-slash-dues-amid-membershipdrop/?slreturn=20181012120933 [http://perma.cc/YMQ3-MDAM].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Ron Rotunda, The ABA Overrules the First Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2016,
7:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-aba-overrules-the-first-amendment-1471388418.
9 The significance of the ABA’s “well qualified” rating for judicial nominees, which Senate
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has called the “gold standard by which judicial candidates are
judged,” also gets inconsistent treatment. See Ed Whelan, Schumer Smears Judicial Nominee
Thomas Farr, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:21 AM), www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/schumer-smears-judicial-nomineee-thomas-farr [http://perma.cc/7UHT-2Q5F].
10 Ronald D. Rotunda, Legal Memorandum: The ABA Decision to Control What Lawyers
Say: Supporting “Diversity” but not Diversity of Thought, HERITAGE FOUND., Oct. 6, 2016, at
A4, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/LM-191.pdf [http://perma.cc/GMU2-2892].
11 Ronald D. Rotunda, Applying the Revised ABA Model Rules in the Age of the
Internet: The Problem of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 176 (2013).
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The ABA’s inherent self-interest is, moreover, more likely to
favor the interests of large law firms, not solo or small firms.12
One might think that lawyers who combine an “intimate
knowledge of the subject matter” with experience in drafting
documents and rules would avoid ambiguity and speak with
clarity. That is not the case with Model Rule 8.4(g) and its
Comments. Two practitioners concluded that the Model Rule “is
riddled with unanswered questions, including but not limited
to . . . the meaning of key terms, how it interplays with other
provisions of the Model Rules, and what disciplinary sanction
should apply to a violation; as well as due process and First
Amendment free expression infirmities.”13 For example, to what
extent does the rule’s coverage of “conduct related to the practice
of law” reach a bumper sticker on a lawyer’s car driven to and
from depositions or court hearings, or a Washington Redskins
t-shirt worn at a bar-sponsored 5K ?14
B. The ABA’s Reasons for Adopting Model Rule 8.4(g)
The ABA advanced a variety of reasons for adopting Model
Rule 8.4(g).15 Some of the mandarins sought to turn lawyers into
societal leaders and burnish the reputation of lawyers generally.
Others saw the need for a rule that would deter sexual harassment
that occurred outside the range of the administration of justice.
For her part, past ABA President Paulette Brown said that
lawyers are “responsible for making our society better” and that
because of lawyers’ “power,” lawyers should be “the standard by
which all should aspire.”16 In a similar way, representatives from
the Oregon New Lawyers Division of the ABA’s Young Lawyers
Division proposed a resolution which pointed to “a need for a
cultural shift in understanding the inherent integrity of people
regardless of their race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex,
gender identity, gender expression, marital status, or disability, to
be captured in the rules of professional conduct.”17 In short, lawyers
are supposed to lead, and the ethical rules should make us do it.
12 See Steven Chung, The ABA Is Losing Money Because It Does Not Provide Value To
Small Firms, ABOVE L. (May 7, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/the-aba-islosing-money-because-it-does-not-provide-value-to-small-firms [http://perma.cc/8RP5-H6UA].
13 Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct
8.4(g): Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J.
LEGAL PROF. 201, 257 (2017).
14 See John J. Park, More on the ABA’s Threat to Free Speech, FEDERALIST SOC’Y
(June 19, 2017), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/more-on-the-aba-s-threat-to-freespeech [http://perma.cc/8L5W-7UML].
15 See States split on new ABA Model Rule, supra note 2.
16 Rotunda, supra note 8.
17 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Memorandum on Draft
Proposal to Amend Model Rule 8.4 at 2 (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
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At a 2016 hearing, though, “several witnesses expressed their
concerns about sexual harassment that occurs during the practice
of law, and in particular at after-hours social functions.”18
The ABA’s report, justifying the final version of Rule 8.4(g), cited the
“substantial anecdotal information” provided to the Standing
Committee of “sexual harassment” at “activities such as firm dinners
and other nominally social events at which lawyers are present solely
because of their association with their law firm or in connection with
the practice of law.”19

The general effect was to broaden the reach of the new rule from
conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” to “conduct
related to the practice of law.”20
The Standing Committee summed it up this way, suggesting
that the need for the new rule “transcends the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.”21 That is true whether “such conduct is or
is not common in our [legal] profession.”22 It explained, “It is time
that harassment and discriminatory conduct by a lawyer based
on race, religion, sex, disability, LGBTQ status or other factors,
be considered professional misconduct when such conduct is
related to the practice of law.”23 In sum:
[T]he public has a right to know that as a largely self-governing
profession we hold ourselves to normative standards of conduct in all
our professional activities, in furtherance of the public’s interest in
respect for the rule of law and for those who interpret and apply the
law, the legal profession.24

We are often reminded how remarkable it is that the ABA
believes itself entitled to speak for all lawyers, especially given
the relatively small number of lawyers who are actually
members. Model Rule 8.4(g) is just another iteration of that
tendency. Its desire to bind them all to its self-improvement
regime is breathtaking.

dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/rule_8_4_language_choice_memo_12_22_2
015.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8NV-MNFZ] [hereinafter Language Choice
Memo] (emphasis added); see also Rotunda, supra note 10, at A3 (“We must change the
Model Rules not to protect clients, not to protect the courts and the system of justice, and not
to protect the role of lawyers as officers of the court. No, the purpose is much more
grandiose: to create a ‘cultural shift.’”).
18 See Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 244 (2017).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 251.
21 Language Choice Memo, supra note 17, at 7.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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II. PROPOSED NEW MODEL RULE 8.4(G)
Under amended Model Rule 8.4(g), it would be misconduct for
a lawyer to engage in conduct that he or she “knows or reasonably
should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic
status in conduct related to the practice of law.”25 The covered
conduct can be either “verbal or physical conduct,” including
“unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”26
The text of the proposed rule alone represents a massive
expansion in the scope of disciplinary authority. Model Rule
8.4(d) currently provides, “it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to engage in conduct that is ‘prejudicial to the
administration of justice.’”27 Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4 was
added in 1998.28 It states that a lawyer who, “in the course of
representing a client, . . . knowingly manifests, by words or
conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic
status . . . .” violates the rule when such actions are “prejudicial
to the administration of justice.”29
Significantly, the comment did not impose discipline; only the
rules did. In 2015, the ABA observed that adding the comment “was
a compromise result reached after six years of proposals and
counterproposals.”30 It explained, though, “[b]y addressing this
issue in a comment . . . the compromise did not make
manifestations of bias or prejudice such as discrimination or
harassment a separate and direct violation of the Model Rules.”31
The new rule creates a violation in circumstances in which the
old rule did not. It starts by adding characteristics to the previous
list of eight. The new rule’s text expressly covers eleven separate
characteristics to be protected from demeaning or derogatory
speech.32 That’s three more than old Comment 3, with the addition
of ethnicity, gender identity, and marital status.33 The ABA said
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
Id. at r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3.
See Language Choice Memo, supra note 17, at 2.
See Handel Destinvil, ABA Committee Proposes New Model Rule of Professional
Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
committees/minority-trial-lawyer/practice/2016/aba-committee-proposes-new-model-ruleprofessional-conduct/ [http://perma.cc/3UQ6-SYNK].
29 Language Choice Memo, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 1.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2.
33 See id. at 2–3; see also id. at 5 (“‘Gender identity’ is relevant as a new social awareness
of the individuality of gender has changed the traditional binary concept of sexuality.”).
25
26
27
28
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that the “additional categories reflect current concerns regarding
discriminatory practices.”34
New Comment 3 expands the definition of “harassment” to
include “derogatory or demeaning verbal . . . conduct.”35 That
means that, as Josh Blackman notes, the rule’s scope is not
limited to sexual harassment, but reaches derogatory or
demeaning speech touching on any of the protected classes.36
That said, “speech that satisfies any of these definitions is
entirely protected by the First Amendment . . . .”37
Comment 3 does state, “[t]he substantive law of
antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may
guide application of paragraph (g).”38 That part of the Comment is
not entirely clear. If the substantive law does apply, the speech at
issue should have to be sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to
constitute an “abusive working environment” before it can be the
basis for discipline.39 If it “may” (or “may not”) apply, then what
happens with a single remark that is perceived to be “harassing? ”
“Conduct related to the practice of law” also has an
expansive reach. Comment 4 states, in part:
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing
clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel,
lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law; operating
or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in bar
association, business or social activities in connection with the
practice of law. 40

The representation of clients and a lawyer’s interactions with
witnesses, court personnel, other lawyers, and others fit neatly into
conduct that might be prejudicial to the administration of justice.
“Conduct related to the practice of law” reaches far more broadly to
cover a lawyer’s “bar association, business or social activities.” The
new rule could be applied to speech at dinners hosted by bar
associations or similar legal groups, teaching at law schools, and a
lawyer’s speaking “at career day at his or her child’s Catholic school
about the role of faith in the practice of law.”41 “The important
question is not whether a [listener’s] reaction is ‘reasonable,’ but

Id. at 4.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
36 Blackman, supra note 18, at 244–46.
37 Id. at 245 (emphasis in original).
38 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
39 Blackman, supra note 18, at 245 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 787–88 (1998)).
40 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
41 Blackman, supra note 18, at 247–48.
34
35
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whether a [speaker] should ‘reasonably’ know a [listener] will be
triggered by disrespectful speech.”42
Of course, the ABA’s mandarins made sure to protect their
own. Comment 4 states, in part, “[l]awyers may engage in conduct
undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without violating
this Rule by, for example, implementing initiatives aimed at
recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or
sponsoring diverse law student organizations.”43 Josh Blackman
notes, “[t]his comment amounts to an unconstitutional form of
viewpoint discrimination.”44 It “explicitly sanctions one perspective”
on the divisive issue of affirmative action, while exposing the other
side to potential discipline.45
III. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In recent years, offended observers have pursued a variety of
claims directed at clothing they have found offensive. In 2015, a
federal judge upheld the revocation of the Washington Redskins’
trademark by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board, which concluded that the trademark was
disparaging to Native Americans.46 In 2016, the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission remanded a claim that the
wearing of a cap bearing the Gadsden Flag insignia (“Don’t Tread
on Me”) in a workplace for consideration of whether that made for
a racially discriminatory work environment.47
Events like those prompt consideration of whether Model Rule
8.4(g) would reach the wearing of a Washington Redskins
championship t-shirt at a bar-sponsored 5K run. What about a
lawyer with Gadsden Flag license plates, which Virginia will issue,
or a Gadsden Flag bumper sticker on his or her car? If driven to a
bar convention or work, would that make the lawyer’s actions
“conduct related to the practice of law”?
Certainly, one might think that the First Amendment would
have a bearing on the propriety of enforcing Model Rule 8.4(g) in

Id. at 248.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
Blackman, supra note 18, at 259.
Id.
In 2018, after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744
(2017), the Fourth Circuit vacated the order to revoke the trademark. See Erik Brady, Appeals
Court Vacates Decisions that Canceled Redskins Trademark Registrations, USA TODAY (Jan.
18, 2018, 8:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2018/01/18/appeals-court-vacatesdecisions-canceled-redskins -trademark-registrations/1046758001/ [http://perma.cc/6UUY-78EF].
47 See Eugene Volokh, Wearing ‘Don’t Tread on Me’ insignia could be punishable racial
harassment, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/wearing-dont-tread-on-me-insignia-could-be-punishable-racialharassment/?utm_term=.10ab86ecdfa6 [http://perma.cc/QUM9-EBKD].
42
43
44
45
46
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those cases, among others involving speech. But, “[t]he most
striking aspect of the adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) is how little
awareness the ABA expressed about the boundless scope of
prohibited speech.”48
An earlier draft of Comment 3 from December 2015
“stressed that the rule ‘does not apply to conduct unrelated to
the practice of law or conduct protected by the First
Amendment.’”49 It also recognized a “private sphere” in which
“personal opinion . . . religious expression, and political speech”
would receive First Amendment protection. 50
At the February 2016 hearing, however, a former ABA
president complained that allowing for First Amendment protection
of some speech would make it very difficult to enforce the rule
because such protection would “take away” from its purpose.51 In
the end, her “position prevailed, and the proviso was removed in the
second draft.”52 Josh Blackman observes, “[n]either the final rule,
nor the comments, nor the ratified report, makes any reference to
the First Amendment. This regrettable omission was deliberate.”53
Contrary to that record, though, the First Amendment
protects speech even when it is unpopular, harmful, derogatory,
or demeaning. “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”54 The First Amendment protects
offensive, disagreeable, and even hurtful speech.55
Just last term, in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,56 the
Court found a Minnesota law banning the wearing of political
apparel at the polling place facially unconstitutional. The apparel in
question was a t-shirt bearing the Tea Party logo and the words
“Don’t Tread on Me” and a button saying “Please I.D. Me.”57 Even
though Minnesota had a permissible objective in limiting
distractions in the polling place, its law swept too broadly and
indeterminably to be constitutionally applied.58 If Minnesota cannot
Blackman, supra note 18, at 248.
Id. (citing ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Notice of Public
Hearing 14 (2015)).
50 Id. at 248–49.
51 Id. at 249 (quoting former ABA President Laurel Bellows).
52 Id. at 250 (emphasis in original).
53 Id.
54 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
55 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
56 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891–92 (2018).
57 Id. at 1884.
58 Id. at 1880, 1888.
48
49
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regulate political speech in polling places, the ABA should not be
able to regulate it in activities related to the practice of law.
More generally, Josh Blackman and others have pointed to
the Court’s decision in National Institute of Family and Life
Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),59 as authority for concluding that
Model Rule 8.4(g) is unconstitutional.60 In comments submitted
to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
Professor Blackman argued that, even as modified by
Pennsylvania, Model Rule 8.4(g) “raise[d] constitutional
concerns” that were “highlighted” by NIFLA.61 In its comment
letter of July 17, 2018, urging the Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania not to adopt that modified
version of Model Rule 8.4(g), the Christian Legal Society pointed
to both NIFLA and Matal v. Tam.62
In NIFLA, the Court held that challengers who contended
that a California law requiring licensed and unlicensed
pregnancy-related clinics to make specified disclosures violated
the First Amendment were likely to prevail on their challenges.63
It reversed the Ninth Circuit decision affirming the denial of
injunctive relief.64 The law required the licensed clinics to display
messages concerning the availability of public funding for
abortions, a practice that those clinics opposed.65
The Court determined that the California law was a
content-based regulation of speech because it “compel[led]
individuals to speak a particular message . . . ‘alter[ing] the content
of their speech.’”66 It rejected the contention that the clinics’ speech
was entitled to less than strict scrutiny because professional speech
was involved.67 While professional speech and conduct may be
regulated in some circumstances, neither of those circumstances
was present.68 First, to the extent that “more deferential review”

138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
See, e.g., Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of Law Hous., to
Office of the Sec’y, The Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa. (July 13, 2018),
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Letter-PennsylvaniaBlackman.pdf [http://perma.cc/E6RP-MGU3].
61 See id.
62 See Letter from David Nammo, CEO & Exec. Dir. Christian Legal Soc’y, to
Office of the Sec’y, The Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa. (July 17, 2018),
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Christian%20Legal%20S
ociety%20PA%20Comment%20Letter%20Submitted.pdf [http://perma.cc/WA9S-TGQU].
63 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2368.
66 Id. at 2371 (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
795 (1988)).
67 Id. at 2371–72.
68 Id. at 2372.
59
60
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may be applied “to some laws that require professionals to disclose
factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial
speech,’” the required notices did not relate to the services the
clinics provided, but to “state-sponsored services—including
abortion . . . .”69 Second, to the extent professional conduct
incidentally burdens speech can be regulated, the law regulated
“speech as speech.”70
Accordingly, the California law was subjected to strict
scrutiny as a content-based regulation of speech.71 The Court
noted that, as for the regulation of licensed clinics and the
desire to educate low-income women, the required notice was
“wildly underinclusive.”72 As for the unlicensed clinics, any
justification offered by California was nothing more than
“purely hypothetical.”73
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch, saw “viewpoint
discrimination [as] inherent in the design and structure” of the
California law.74 Justice Kennedy characterized the law as “a
paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when
government seeks to impose its own message in the place of
individual speech, thought, and expression.”75
NIFLA’s treatment of professional speech is particularly
important. As the Court notes, “[p]rofessionals might have a host of
good-faith disagreements, both with each other and with the
government, on many topics in their respective fields.”76 For example,
in a way that touches on the hot rail of marital status, “lawyers and
marriage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial
agreements or the wisdom of divorce . . . .”77 Restricting the range of
lawyer speech denies access to the test of the market, which the
Court sees as “[t]he best test of truth.”78
Matal v. Tam may well have put another nail in the coffin
bearing this line of attack.79 In Matal, the Court resoundingly
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2372, 2374.
Id. at 2366.
Id. at 2375.
Id. at 2377.
Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2374–75.
77 Id. at 2375. Or, as Josh Blackman proposes, “A speaker remarks over dinner that
unmarried attorneys are better candidates for law firms because they will be able to
dedicate more time to the practice.” Blackman, supra note 18, at 246. Put simply, there is
a myriad of ways to run afoul of Model Rule 8.4(g).
78 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919)).
79 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
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concluded that 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), which prohibits the “registration
of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or . . . bring into contemp[t] or
disrepute’ any ‘persons, living or dead.’ . . . violates the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.”80 The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office relied on that statute in denying a trademark application for
an Asian-American band named the “Slants” because of the offensive
nature of the band’s name.81
Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Alito wrote, the
statute “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may
not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”82
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Breyer,
Justice Alito rejected the contention that the ban was narrowly
tailored, noting that it also reached trademarks like “Down with
racists,” for example.83 Viewed in that light, the disparagement
clause could not be “an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk
clause. In this way, it goes much further than is necessary to serve
the interest asserted.”84 Accordingly, Justice Alito concluded that the
disparagement clause was unconstitutional.85
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.86 Justice
Kennedy wrote separately to “explain[ ] in greater detail why the
First Amendment’s protections against viewpoint discrimination
apply to the trademark here.”87 In that regard, “[t]he test for
viewpoint discrimination is whether—within the relevant subject
category—the government has singled out a subset of messages for
disfavor based on the views expressed.”88
In that regard, “[t]he Government may not insulate a law from
charges of viewpoint discrimination by tying censorship to the
reaction of the speaker’s audience.”89 Justice Kennedy explained,
“[t]he danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is
attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader
debate. The danger is all the greater if the ideas or perspectives are
ones a particular audience might think offensive . . . .”90 Put simply,

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1765.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1766.
Id.
Id. at 1767.
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“a speech burden based on audience reactions is simply government
hostility and intervention in a different guise.”91
That is precisely what Model Rule 8.4(g) contemplates:
Measuring the propriety of speech by the reaction of individuals
listening to or observing it. Someone offended by a discussion of
“mismatch” theory that includes a suggestion that affirmative
action in higher education should be banned because it can hurt
minority students by placing them in an educational setting
where their chances of success are lower than they might be at
a different institution, can complain that the speaker said
something demeaning on the basis of race. 92 Model Rule 8.4(g) is
a recipe for viewpoint discrimination.
Finally, the wide reach of Model Rule 8.4(g), both as to its
live-wire subject areas and as to the range of activities covered, will
inevitably chill both speech and association. For example, Professor
Rotunda points to the St. Thomas More Society, “an organization of
‘Catholic lawyers and judges’ who strengthen their ‘faith through
education, fellowship and prayer.’”93 Any St. Thomas More Society
event, like the Annual Red Mass or a Continuing Legal Education
(CLE) program, would fit within the definition of “conduct related to
the practice of law.” Discussion of issues like gay marriage that does
not include both sides may lead a state bar to conclude that Society
membership violates Model Rule 8.4(g) because it opposes gay
marriage and is not “inclusive.”94
Professor Rotunda notes that, if a state bar opined that
membership in the St. Thomas More Society could violate Model
Rule 8.4(g), “many lawyers may decide that it is better to be safe
than sorry, better to leave the St. Thomas More Society than to
ignore the ethics opinion and risk a battle.”95 Professor Rotunda
also saw the potential for viewpoint discrimination: If a lawyer
belongs to an organization that opposes gay marriage, he or she
“can face problems,” but belonging to an organization that favors
gay marriage brings the lawyer “home free.”96

Id.
See Blackman, supra note 18, at 246.
Rotunda, supra note 10, at 4 (citing ST. THOMAS MORE SOC’Y OF ORANGE COUNTY,
http://www.stthomasmore.net [http://perma.cc/M7FK-VU2T]).
94 Id. at 5.
95 Id.
96 Id.
91
92
93
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AND THE REGULATORS
A. The Regulatory Difficulty
Vesting discretion in the hands of bar regulators and trusting
to their judgment is no solution. Regulators in some state bars have
day jobs, so it makes little sense to load more on them. If adopted,
Model Rule 8.4(g) would do precisely that because of its broad
reach. Moreover, regulatory bodies are capable of disappointing
the trust placed in them.
But, trusting the discretion of regulators is precisely what the
ABA wants us to do. At the Federalist Society’s 2016 National
Lawyers Convention, Professor Deborah Rhode defended Model
Rule 8.4(g) in a debate with Professor Eugene Volokh.97 She
asserted that, because local disciplinary bodies “don’t have enough
resources to go after people who steal from their clients’ trust fund
accounts,” there is little likelihood of their vigorously enforcing
limitations on speech.98 She acknowledged that anyone offended
by a remark made in connection with the practice of law might
make a complaint, but suggested that such complaints would go
nowhere because “we as a profession, I think, have the capacity to
deal with occasional abuses.”99
The problem is more complex than Professor Rhode gives it
credit. The bar disciplinary bodies have no principled way of
dismissing a complaint that arises from a statement that addresses
one of the eleven live-wire categories in a way that offends someone.
They will have to call for a response from the speaker.
On December 17, 2017, the Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania echoed one of Professor Rhode’s
observations: It noted that the “breadth” of the proposed rule “will
pose difficulties for already resource-strapped disciplinary
authorities.”100 It noted, “the rule subjects to discipline not only a
lawyer who knowingly engages in harassment or discrimination,
but also a lawyer who negligently utters a derogatory or demeaning
comment.”101 Even if no discipline is imposed, the process will be
the punishment.

97 Federalist Soc’y, Ninth Annual Rosenkranz Debate: Hostile Environment Law
and the First Amendment, YOUTUBE (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
MYsNkMw32Eg&t=5s [http://perma.cc/7Y32-HPG7].
98 Id.
99 Id.; see also id. (“I don’t think we’d see a lot of toleration for those aberrant complaints.”).
100 Proposed Amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Relating to
Misconduct, 46 PA. BULLETIN 7519 (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/
vol46/46-49/2062.html [http://perma.cc/X2ZC-79PH].
101 Id.
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Professor Rotunda illustrated the problem for bar regulatory
authorities with a hypothetical:
If one lawyer tells another, at the water cooler or a bar association
meeting on tax reform, “I abhor the idle rich. We should raise capital
gains taxes,” he has just violated the ABA rule by manifesting bias
based on socioeconomic status.
If the other lawyer responds, “You’re just saying that because you’re a
short, fat, hillbilly, neo-Nazi,” he’s in the clear, because those epithets
are not in the sacred litany. Of course, that cannot be what the ABA
means, because it is always in good taste to attack the rich. Yet, that
is what the rule says.102

Conversely, a lawyer at the firm coffee pot might tell another,
“low income individuals who receive public assistance should be
subjected to mandatory drug testing.” As Josh Blackman explains,
that statement, which might be seen by an observer as unfairly
provocative, could result in discipline because the speaker
“‘reasonably should know’ that someone at the event could find the
remarks disparaging” toward those of lower socioeconomic status.103
When, as noted above, the bar disciplinary authorities call for
an explanation, the lawyer enters into an administrative process
that lacks some of the constitutional protection one gets in court.
The disciplinary boards “do[ ] not typically open [their] proceedings
to the public, [they] follow[ ] relaxed rules of evidence, and there is
no jury.”104 As with the St. Thomas More Society and its
membership, lawyers will prefer to hold their tongues and have
their speech chilled than visit with the bar disciplinary authorities.
B. An Invitation to Viewpoint Discrimination
Both scenarios present bar regulatory authorities with a
claim that presents a violation on its face. There is no principled
way of dismissing those claims even though the comments are
plainly protected by the First Amendment. They will have to ask for
a response. That response will require the regulators to make finely
honed discretionary judgments. That said, vesting disciplinary
authorities with discretion is an invitation to engage in viewpoint
discrimination. Two recent examples of the consideration shown by
regulatory bodies, however, show both hostility to conservative
messaging and the absence of viewpoint neutrality.
First, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of
Jack Phillips displayed blatant hostility toward his views, as the
Court found in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
102
103
104

Rotunda, supra note 10, at 4.
Blackman, supra note 18, at 246.
Rotunda, supra note 10, at 6.
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Rights Comm’n.105 As the Supreme Court noted, Jack Phillips was
entitled to “neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all
the circumstances of the case,” but he didn’t get it from the
Commission.106 One commissioner asserted, “[f]reedom of religion
and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the
holocaust . . . .”107 The Court noted that such a comparison was
“inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s
antidiscrimination law—a law that protects against discrimination
on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.”108
The same commissioner also described Jack Phillips’ invocation
of his religious beliefs as “one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt
others.”109 The Court explained, “[t]o describe a man’s faith as
‘one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can
use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by
describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as
merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”110
In addition, the Commission and the Colorado Court of
Appeals treated Jack Phillips differently from other bakers who
refused to prepare a cake bearing a message that disapproved of
same-sex marriage.111 Three other bakers were found to have
acted within their rights by declining to create those cakes.112
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the other bakeries
did not discriminate because their action was based on “the
offensive nature of the requested message.”113
The Court found the distinction lacking. As it observed, a
“principled rationale for the difference in treatment . . . cannot be
based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.”114
The Court concluded, “[t]he Colorado court’s attempt to account
for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what is

105 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1729 (2018).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1720.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1731 (quoting Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc, 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8
(Colo. App. 2015)).
114 Id.
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offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official
disapproval of Jack Phillips’ religious beliefs.”115
Put simply, although the Court did not put it this way, the
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals were engaged in
viewpoint discrimination. They were punishing a message they
did not agree with and giving a contrary message, with which
they did agree, a free pass.
Second, the Ohio Elections Commission found itself in the
position of judging the truth of political advertisements regarding
the Affordable Care Act statute. The Susan B. Anthony List (SBA
List) criticized Steve Driehaus (D-OH), asserting that, by voting
for the Act, he voted for a bill that included taxpayer-funded
abortion.116 Driehaus disagreed, arguing that because the Act calls
for insurers to collect a separate payment, segregate those funds,
and use only those segregated funds to pay for abortions, the Act
doesn’t fund abortions.117 SBA List viewed the segregation rule as
an accounting gimmick given the fungibility of money. Both
parties essentially pointed to the same statutory provisions and
drew contrary inferences from them.
Driehaus complained that the SBA List violated an Ohio law
that makes it a criminal offense to make a knowingly or
recklessly “false” statement about a candidate for office or a
ballot initiative.118 By a 2-1 vote on partisan lines, the Ohio
Elections Commission found probable cause to proceed.119
The Court unanimously held that SBA List did not have to wait
for the conclusion of proceedings before the Ohio Elections
Commission to challenge the constitutionality of the Ohio law.120 On
remand, the District Court found the Ohio law unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined its enforcement.121 It observed, “the answer
to false statements in politics is not to force silence, but to
encourage truthful speech in response, and to let the voters, not the
Government, decide what the political truth is.”122
In short, neither the Colorado Human Rights Commission
nor the Ohio Elections Commission proved able to stay away
Id.
See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 154 (2014).
See George F. Will, George Will: Campaign speech case is regulatory overkill,
W ASH . P OST (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george -willcampaign-speech-case-is-regulatory-overkill/2014/04/18/39413958-c652-11e3-bf7abe01a9b69cf1_story.html?utm_term=.ac7d08a0551d [http://perma.cc/GT3S-MAVJ].
118 Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 153.
119 Id. at 154.
120 Id. at 151–52.
121 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 770
(S.D. Ohio 2014).
122 Id.
115
116
117
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from indulging their approval of one side and distaste for the
other. Model Rule 8.4(g) presents bar disciplinary authorities
with the opportunity to do precisely the same thing, and our hope
must be that they will be otherwise too busy to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
Model Rule 8.4(g) has been rejected in eight of the nine
states that have acted on a motion to adopt it.123 Those rejections
rest on sound legal and prudential grounds that should be
persuasive to any other state considering its adoption.
As noted above, the ABA’s membership is one-third or less
than the total number of lawyers in the United States. If the ABA
believes that Model Rule 8.4(g) is such a good idea, it should apply
it to its members as a test before inflicting it on the rest of us.

123 See Scott Flaherty, More States Reject ABA Anti-Bias Ethics Rule, AM. LAWYER
(Sep. 25, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/09/25/more-statesreject-aba-anti-bias-ethics-rule/?slreturn=20190220220613 [http://perma.cc/QE79-MNXJ].
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